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ABSTRACT

The Fifth Amendment's requirement that the government pay "just
compensation" to owners of taken property is typically assumed to
mean "full" compensation, equivalent to the taken property's fair
market value. In this symposium contribution to the Brigham-Kanner
PropertyRights Journal, I explore an often overlooked alternative
understanding of "just compensation" for takings, one freed from
automatic equation with full, fair-market-value compensation. Rooted
in traditional equity, this "equitable compensation" alternative has
significant historical roots, starting with the Fifth Amendment's
drafters' striking choice not to follow the Northwest Ordinance of
1787's requirement of "full" compensation, and running through a line
of cases and commentary that has emphasized takings compensation's
equitable nature. I argue that recognizing takings compensation's
equitable dimension-particularly equity's attention to reciprocal
obligations-can help takings law more naturally respond to thorny
difficulties caused by specific rigidities in takings doctrine, rigidities
that create challenges when takings doctrine is forced to address
situations that differ from core cases of eminent domain. Attending
to the relative weights of parties' reciprocal duties, and equitably
adjusting compensation in response, can help resolve such cases
more plausibly, including takings for private projects with public
benefits (as in Kelo v. New London) and regulatory takings.
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INTRODUCTION

That the U.S. Constitution requires the government to pay "just
compensation" to owners of property taken through eminent domain
is well known, and what "justcompensation" means may seem equally
settled: The U.S. Supreme Court has said that "just compensation"
for taken property is a "full and perfect equivalent in money of the
property taken," an equivalent measured by the taken property's fair
market value.1 And as Justice Jackson famously noted of his Court,
its finality makes it infallible.2
However, doctrines that have become so familiar as to seem infallible can evolve, even in the eyes of courts, when those doctrines no
longer seem adequate to new problems or situations. I am grateful to
the organizers of the 2020 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Confer-

ence for their invitation to contribute a discussion of the "just compensation" requirement to the current volume, and I wish to take
this opportunity to explore briefly an alternative understanding of
"just compensation" for takings, one freed from automatic equation
with full, fair market value compensation. For the sake of convenience,
this alternative, rooted in traditional equity, might be called "equitable
compensation." I shall suggest that the "equitable" understanding
of "just compensation" both has significant historical roots and might
help takings law more naturally respond to thorny difficulties that
spring from specific rigidities in takings doctrine, rigidities that create
challenges when takings doctrine is forced to address situations that

differ from familiar core cases of eminent domain.
1. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1943).
2. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J. concurring) ("We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.").
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What follows is necessarily abbreviated and does not pretend to be
definitive. If persuasive, it will do no more than make a primafacie
case for the value of recognizing an equitable dimension in the just
compensation requirement. My hope is, however, that establishing
thisprimafacie case may open a fruitful discussion about the plausible ways in which "full" and "fair" compensation might sometimes be
two different quantities, and how recognizing those situations might
yield a more coherent and less contentious takings jurisprudence.
I. DISCRETE DOCTRINE FOR CONTINUOUS PROBLEMS
The constitutional foundation for prominent contemporary takings
debates rests on the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause,3 which
effectively provides a checklist of four elements, each of which must
be satisfied for a governmental action to qualify as a justified taking.
Each element corresponds to a separate word or phrase in the clause:
"nor shall private [1] propertybe [2] taken for [3] public use, without
[4] just compensation."'
A fundamental feature of the first three of these four elements is
their binary, all-or-nothing nature. The item in dispute either is property or it is not. It either was taken, or it was not. And the intended
use either was public, or it was not. Such determinations leave little
room for shades of gray, and yet any one of these determinations
can decide the outcome of a case. Thus, these determinations are
absolute, both in nature and in consequence.'
Forcing every specific instance of an alleged taking onto one side or
the other of these bright-line divides is straightforward enough when
dealing with garden-variety takings cases, such as condemning a
private home so that the city can build a police station there.' The
3. State constitutions also have a role to play, but since those constitutions commonly
contain provisions closely modeled on the U.S. Constitution's Takings Clause, the issues raised
here with respect to the latter can be expected to apply to the former as well. Independent of any
state constitutional provisions, courts also read the Fourteenth Amendment as providing constitutional protections in the context of takings by state governments. See, e.g., 1A NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.8 (Julius L. Sackman et al. eds., 3 ed. 2021).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
5. In Carol Rose's terminology, takings doctrine is quite crystalline. See Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577 (1988).
6. As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, "The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property."
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 528 (2005).
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farther that a case is located from paradigm instances of takings, however, the less obvious it may become on which side of a relevant line
the case belongs. As a result, each of these elements has spawned its
own jurisprudence when courts have needed to apply these rigid cate7
gories to circumstances removed from the relatively easy core cases.
Indeed, two of the most controversial areas of takings scholarship
and takings law spring from the need to draw these binary distinctions: takings for private projects with public benefits, and regulatory takings. The central question in these cases is how to categorize
the project or regulation, when only two options are available. And
the consequences of that categorization can be enormous. If a project
with both public and private benefits is deemed to be for public use,
then the owner of property condemned to advance that project has
no choice but to relinquish the property and accept in return what-

ever amount of money is deemed to be the property's market value.
But if the project is ruled to be for private use, then the condemnation is prohibited altogether. Likewise, if a regulation is deemed to
have gone "too far"-as Justice Holmes put it in PennsylvaniaCoal
v. Mahon-and thus to constitute a taking, the government must pay
the burdened parties the full market value of the loss that they suffered, an obligation that in practice will often make the regulation
8
infeasibly expensive, and thus impossible to impose altogether. But
if the regulation has not crossed the nebulous line that determines
how far is "too far," then the state is free to impose that regulation,
and the burdened owner gets nothing.'
The reason that such cases are controversial is that the facts that
give rise to them do not easily fit within a binary doctrinal framework,
7. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (addressing whether the
item in question qualified as property); Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23
(2012) (addressing whether the property was taken); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005) (addressing whether the taking was for public use); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S.
369 (1943) (addressing whether the owner received just compensation for the taken property).
8. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). See also First Eng. Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Cty., 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (specifying that once
a regulation has been deemed a taking, the government's three possible options are "amendment
of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent domain.").
For concerns about the infeasibility of paying compensation, see Section IV.B, infra.
9. Sometimes, as in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978), the regulation itself may provide partial compensation (see Section IV.B, infra.) However, regulations that do not constitute takings are not obligated to provide such compensation,
and this sort of voluntary compensation can give rise to its own set of problems. See, e.g.,
Christopher Serkin, Penn Central Take Two, 92 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (2016).
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resulting in high-stakes questions for which there are no obvious

answers. The world which the law seeks to regulate sometimes is
continuous rather than discrete.1 0 Rather than neatly falling into
one category or another, cases may lie at some intermediate point on
a spectrum between two poles. As a result, government projects and
regulations sometimes are partially one kind of thing, while simultaneously partially a different kind of thing.
Consider, for example, the challenge that faced the U.S. Supreme
Court in Kelo v. City of New London, where the Court had to decide
whether taking property for use by private companies as part of an
economic redevelopment project qualified as a "public" use or as
merely a "private" use." The project in question involved building
various attractions, including a hotel, a museum for the U.S. Coast
Guard, and a large research center for the Pfizer pharmaceutical company. The plan later evolved to give a private developer a 99-year
lease for $1 on some of the project property in exchange for agreeing
to develop that land in accordance with the development plan.12 The
city claimed that the project was "projected to create in excess of 1,000
jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city, including its downtown and waterfront areas." 1
When private property owners challenged the validity of the use
of eminent domain to take their property for use in this project, takings doctrine required the Court to decide whether the project was
"public" or "private," when in fact the project was simultaneously
somewhat public and somewhat private.1 4 Existing doctrine, however, provided no way to reach a decision that matched this reality,
10. Larry Alexander has used the terms "scalar" and "binary" in discussing related phenomena in moral philosophy. Larry Alexander, ScalarProperties,Binary Judgments, 25 J.
APPLIED PHIL. 85 (2008).
11. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). For similar examples, see Kaur u.
N. Y. State Urban Dec. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010) (concerning the exercise of eminent
domain to take property in a "blighted" Manhattan neighborhood for use by Columbia University); Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d. 164 (N.Y. 2009) (concerning the
exercise of eminent domain to take property in the "Atlantic Yards" area of Brooklyn for a

land improvement project involving a private developer's mixed-use development).
12. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 476 n.4.
13. Id. at 472.
14. Others have noted that the all-or-nothing nature of the "public use" determination can
intensify the harmful consequences of judicial error in such determinations and can create in-

centives for governments to act in socially undesirable ways. See James E. Krier & Christopher
Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 864-65 (2004).
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demanding instead an all-or-nothing choice. The result was a decision
beset by controversy.1 5 Such controversy was perhaps inevitable, for
when courts are compelled to decide whether an effectively hybrid
governmental act is wholly inside or wholly outside rigid doctrinal

categories, either decision will necessarily be partially inadequate.
A similar challenge arises when courts attempt to determine which
sorts of government restrictions on the use of private property constitute a "taking" of that property-i.e., whether a "regulatory taking"
has occurred. Once again, the law requires a binary, all-or-nothing
decision. If the regulation is deemed to constitute a taking, then the
aggrieved property owner is entitled to full compensation for the inflicted loss. And the cost of providing that compensation, either to
one particular owner or to everyone who is similarly burdened, may be

so high that the government, as a practical matter, may not be able to
afford to impose the regulation at all. On the other hand, if the court
deems the regulation not to be a taking, then the property owner
receives zero compensation, and the government can impose the
regulation at no monetary cost to itself beyond the cost of enforcement.
But, as in the case of hybrid public-private uses, the world to which
this doctrine is applied does not always fall neatly onto one side or the
other of the regulatory takings threshold. Justice Holmes's question
in Mahon (Did the regulation go "too far"?) implicitly acknowledged
that the burdens imposed by regulations come in degrees. Nevertheless, the need to determine whether a taking either has or has not
occurred requires drawing a sharp distinction between regulations
on the near side of the "too far" line and regulations that have crossed
that line.16
15. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Case Won on Appeal (To Public), NEW YORK TIMES (July 30,
2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/30/weekinreview/the-nation-case-won-on-appeal-to

-public.html (noting that the Kelo decision "provoked outrage from Democrats and Republicans,
liberals and libertarians, and everyone betwixt and between. Dozens of state legislatures
considered bills to protect private property from government seizure, and many passed new
legislation; Justice John Paul Stevens, the author of the decision, issued something like an
apology; a campaign was started to use eminent domain to seize the home of another justice,
David H. Souter .... ").
16. Although regulatory takings questions commonly involve determining whether a
regulation has gone "too far," U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence has identified a few very
narrow situations in which a regulation will automatically be deemed a taking. See Cedar
Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021) (holding that a regulation requiring agricultural
employers to allow union organizers onto the employers' property for up to three hours per
day, 120 days per year constituted a per se taking); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S.
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Such determinations are not self-evident. Holmes in Mahon presented a four-factor test to guide the Court in reaching that determination, but the factors offered do not promise a reliably neat binary
conclusion.17 Two of the factors rely on quantities that lie somewhere
on a continuum of values: how much diminution in value the regulation had caused and whether the owner burdened by the regulation
was also receiving benefits from that regulation's application to others
("average reciprocity of advantage"). A third factor-whether a regu-

lation addresses a public nuisance-does involve a binary determination on its face, but nuisance decisions themselves can be contentious,
as nuisance doctrine inherently lacks the bright-line character of
trespass law. 18 And the fourth factor-whether the regulation destroyed an existing property or contract right-was itself controversial,
rejected by Brandeis's dissent as irrelevant."
Passage of time did not clarify matters, and when the Court
revisited the regulatory takings issue in Penn Central, it offered a
somewhat different set of factors. 20 Compounding the resulting uncertainty in regulatory takings doctrine, neither the Mahon Court
nor the Penn CentralCourt offered any clear guidance about exactly

how their stated factors should be combined and balanced to generate
the required ultimate conclusion. This silence was not the courts'
fault; the situations simply were not amenable to greater certainty.2 1
The need to make high-stakes, all-or-nothing choices between two
possible outcomes in circumstances where neither answer is clearly
528, 528 (2005) ("Regulatory actions generally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes (1) where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical
invasion of her property, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
or (2) where regulations completely deprive an owner of 'all economically beneficial us[e]' of
her property, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019.").
17. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
18. See, e.g., 81 JOHN A. GEBAUER, N.Y. JUR. 2D NUISANCES § 1 (2021) ("There is no exact
rule or formula by which the existence of a nuisance may be determined, but each case must

stand on its own facts."); Rose, supranote 5, at 579 ("[N]uisance is one of those extraordinarily
shapeless doctrinal areas in the law of property.... You don't know in advance how to answer
these questions and how to weigh the answers against each other; that is to say, you don't
know whether your building will be found a nuisance or not, and you won't really know until

you go through the pain and trouble of getting a court to decide the issue after you have built
it or have had plans drawn up.").

19. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 420 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
20. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
21. The Penn Central court described these questions as "essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries." Id.
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right is not unique to the takings context-many situations in life

do not fit neatly in pre-existing categories-nor may it always be of
concern. 22 If two parties find themselves in this sort of situation
often, so that there are multiple cases, and thus multiple decisions,
the judgments may tend to "even out" as some cases are deemed to
fall on one side of the relevant line, while others are deemed to fall
on the other side, causing the cumulative result to reflect something
close to the average "correct" answer. Unfortunately, eminent domain cases are commonly quite different. Unless the owner of the
taken property is quite unfortunate, he or she is unlikely to have
property condemned more than once. Hence, there is little opportunity for evening out, and each private owner remains at a risk of

suffering a considerable loss.23
Trying to force a continuous world into discrete, binary doctrinal
categories can therefore produce an unfortunate combination of high
stakes and low certainty. As courts have struggled with that combination in cases that differ significantly from the central paradigms
of eminent domain, the result might seem to be a perpetually unsettled and ultimately unsatisfying doctrinal morass.
At first glance, this unfortunate state of affairs may seem inescapable. After all, the law has to reach one decision or another in such
cases, and reality is unlikely to lose its sometimes graduated nature.
Hence, binary takings decisions may initially seem to be unavoidable even when reality is non-binary.
That worrisome conclusion, however, overlooks the presence of
the fourth takings element: the requirement of "just compensation."
Unlike the other three elements-whether there was a "property"
interest at stake, whether the property interest was "taken," and
whether the taking was for a "public" use-the fourth, just compensation element is naturally amenable to gradation, because compensation can be awarded in different amounts. When deciding what
22. For a discussion of similar concerns principally in the context of criminal law and tort
law, see Adam Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 655 (2014).
23. In theory, spreading that risk through private insurance might be possible, but in
practice insurance against takings is not available. See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Compensationfor Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 593-96
(1984) (noting the absence of private insurance against takings and attributing that absence
to moral hazard and adverse-selection problems).
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amount of compensation to award, the question isn't "whether," but instead "how much," and the answer to that question isn't limited to
"yes" or "no" but could theoretically be any dollar amount imagin-

able. At least in principle, courts' decisions about how much compensation to award could therefore make smooth the sharp discontinuities

created by the binary nature of the other three elements of takings
doctrine. In cases which seemed truly to be partly one thing and

partly another, the level of compensation could be adjusted to better
reflect the reality of the situation, enhancing certainty and predictability, and reducing the number of extreme outcomes. Those benefits, in turn, might also reduce the risk of popular outrage and increase

the perceived legitimacy of the property law system as a whole.
Later I will discuss how this abstract suggestion might be translated into practical applications in the two sets of controversial
cases just mentioned, but first it is necessary to address what might

seem to be two fatal objections to this suggestion: First, that wellestablished takings doctrine is quite clear that courts' flexibility in
awarding compensation is very limited. And, second, that allowing
courts this flexibility would be undesirable, even if it were doctrinally possible, because it would give judges dangerously unfettered
discretion in awarding compensation. The answer to both objections,
I shall suggest, lies in recognizing the equitable dimension of takings
compensation. The Constitutional requirement of "just compensation" might sometimes best be understood as a requirement of "equitable compensation."

II. "JUST COMPENSATION" AND "FULL COMPENSATION"
A. CurrentDoctrine
Today, the Fifth Amendment's requirement of "just" compensation is canonically taken to be synonymous with "full" compensation.
In the leading case on the question, United States v. Miller, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that "just compensation" was a "full and perfect
equivalent in money of the property taken."" That monetary equivalent, in turn, was determined by "what a willing buyer would pay in
cash to a willing seller" in order to acquire the property.2 5 In other
24. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).
25. Id. at 374.
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words, just compensation is full compensation, and full compensation is fair market value compensation.
Although this elaboration of the meaning of "just compensation"
is now so familiar that its mention can easily pass without drawing
a second glance, there is nothing logically necessary about equating
"just" compensation with "full" or "fair market value" compensation.
There are many competing understandings of justice, and even more
potential different conclusions about what any one of those understandings would require when applied to specific contexts, such as
government interactions with private property.26
Hence, a fundamental question is why the Miller Court thought
that this particular elaboration of "just compensation" was the appropriate elaboration. Unfortunately, the Court's discussion of this
point was quite thin, resting principally on the observation that the
Court had said something similar in 1893 when deciding Monongahela
NavigationCo. v. United States.2 7 And the MonongahelaCourt in turn
28
offered little more than a declaration that the equivalence is true.
Perhaps these courts implicitly conceived of eminent domain as
a form of "forced sale." Historically, that particular conception has
been common. For example, in Boston & Roxbury Milldam Corp. v.
Newman, the Massachusetts Supreme Court declared, "The principle
is, that the lands of individuals are holden subject to the requisitions
of the public exigencies, a reasonable compensation being paid for
the damage. It is not taking the property of one man and giving it to
another. At most, it is a forced sale, to satisfy the pressing want of
26. For one overview of various theories of justice, see David Miller, Justice, in STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice/. For an example of

how specific understandings of justice can affect conclusions about compensation for takings,
see two papers by Hanoch Dagan arguing for adjusting takings compensation based on
progressive egalitarian principles: Hanoch Dagan, Re-ImaginingTakings Law, in PROPERTY
AND COMMUNITY 39 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Penalver eds., 2009); Hanoch
Dagan, Takings and DistributiveJustice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741 (1999).
27. Miller, 317 U.S. at 373 (citing Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S.
312 (1893)).
28. Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 325 ("when he surrenders to the public something more and
different from that which is exacted from other members of the public, a full and just equivalent
shall be returned to him"); id. at 336 ("if the adjective 'just' had been omitted, and the provision
was simply that property should not be taken without compensation, the natural import of the
language would be that the compensation should be the equivalent of the property. And this
is made emphatic by the adjective 'just.' There can, in view of the combination of those two
words, be no doubt that the compensation must be a full and perfect equivalent for the property taken.").
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It has never been disputed that when property taken by eminent
domain is of such a character that its market value can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such value is the measure of
compensation. The use of market value as a test in land damage
cases preceded the publication of judicial decisions in this country, so that we find it looked upon as an established principle in
the earliest reported cases.3 0

-

the public."" If a taking is merely a "forced sale," and the compensation paid is akin to the payment that would have been made in an
ordinary purchase, then the property's current market price might
seem to be a natural measure of the compensation owed.
The difficulty with this reasoning is that a "forced" sale is fundamentally different from a genuine sale, which depends upon a
voluntary agreement between the parties, and for which the price
is deemed to be just only to the extent that the parties voluntarily
agreed upon that price. What a "willing" buyer would pay a "willing"
seller in cash has little obvious relevance to what is owed in situations which arise only when the "seller" is unwilling. Determining
what justice requires in such circumstances necessarily must involve something more than merely invoking what would satisfy
justice in fundamentally different circumstances. Thus, even the
"forced sale" analogy leaves open the question of why the just "price"
for that forced "sale" is determined by the property's market value.
Ultimately, these courts may simply have thought that the equation
of "justcompensation" with full market-value compensation was obvious. They would not have been the first to do so, and Nichols, in his
prominent early twentieth-century treatise, went so far as to assert:

29. Bos. & Roxbury Milldam Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. 467, 485 (1832). See also Miss.
& Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 407-08 (1878) ("In determining the value
of land appropriated for public purposes, the same considerations are to be regarded as in a
sale of property between private parties."); 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.142[6] (2016)
(asserting that acceptance of the theory that eminent domain is a compulsory sale "seems
almost inevitable" in jurisdictions that require payment of compensation in advance for taken
property); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139 ("The public is now considered as an

individual, treating with an individual for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to
oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price .... ).
30. 1 PHILIP NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 217 (2nd ed. 1917). (The current
edition of Nichols's treatise retains that language. 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.01[3]
(2021).) Another treatise from the same era raised the question "Is Market Value the Only

Standard?" and then laconically answered, "The market value of property is usually the basis
for assessment." CARMAN F. RANDOLPH, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES

§ 252, at 234 (1894). See alsoUnited States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 344 (1923)
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However, history shows that equating just compensation with
full, fair market value compensation is not obvious. Indeed, it may
not even have been what the Fifth Amendment itself actually was
intended or understood to mean when it was drafted and ratified.
B. "Full"or "Just"?
Although there is little historical evidence about the drafting of the
Takings Clause, and little record of debate about its ratification, it
has often been noted that the Takings Clause had three historical
antecedents: the Vermont Constitution of 1777, the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780, and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.31 Curiously, there has been little attention to the fact that the wording of
these three predecessors differs, both from the Takings Clause and
from each other. Where the Takings Clause required "just" compensation, the Vermont Constitution required payment of "an equivalent
in money,"32 the Massachusetts Constitution required "reasonable"
compensation,3 3 and the Northwest Ordinance required "full" compensation.34
One cannot draw definitive conclusions from a historical record
as sparse as that which exists for the creation of the Takings Clause.
Nevertheless, it is striking that those who created the Takings Clause
chose not to adopt the "full compensation" wording of the Northwest
Ordinance-a foundational constitutional document enacted only
two years earlier-but instead chose to require compensation that
is "just."
(stating, in rather circular fashion, "Where private property is taken for public use, and there
is a market price prevailing at the time and place of the taking, that price is just compensation.... More would be unjust to the United States, and less would deny the owner what
he is entitled to.").
31. For a summary of these historical antecedents, see William Treanor, The Origins and
OriginalSignificance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J.
694, 701-08 (1985).
32. Vt. Const. of 1777, ch. I, art. II ("whenever any particular man's property is taken for
the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in money.").
33. Mass. Const. of 1780, part I, art. X ("And whenever the public exigencies require, that
the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor.").
34. Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, § 14, art. 2, reprinted in
1 U.S.C. at LV (2006) ("should the public exigencies make it necessary, for the common preservation, to take any person's property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation
shall be made for the same").
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This choice cannot plausibly be attributed to ignorance of the
Northwest Ordinance's language. The Congress that drafted the Bill
of Rights certainly was familiar with the Ordinance's provisions,
since one of Congress's first acts under the Constitution, executed
the very same year that it was drafting the Bill of Rights, was "reenacting" the Ordinance (with minor modifications), to address concerns that its original enactment had been beyond the powers
granted Congress by the Articles of Confederation.35 Nor is it plausible that the Ordinance might have been overlooked as insignificant,

since, as Gordon Wood commented, "[a]part from winning the War of
Independence, [the Northwest Ordinance] was the greatest accomplishment of the Confederation Congress."3" Peter Onuffs similar
appraisal of the Ordinance as "one of the most important documents
of the American founding period" is now commonplace. 37
Likewise, it is unlikely that the Bill of Rights' drafters would have
considered the document to be inferior work unworthy of attention.
Benjamin Fletcher Wright suggested that the Constitution's provision prohibiting the impairment of contracts was directly inspired
by similar provision in the Northwest Ordinance, a provision that
appeared in the very same article which contained the "full compensation" requirement for taken property.3 8 And Joseph Story praised
the Ordinance as "equally remarkable for the beauty and exactness
of its text, and for its masterly display of the fundamental principles
of civil and religious and political liberty.""
35. Dennis P. Duffey, Note, The Northwest Ordinance as Constitutional Document, 95

COLUM. L. REV. 929, 940 n.77 (1995).
36. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY 122 (2009).
37. PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE
xxiii (2019). See alsoAnon., Introduction,in THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE: ESSAYS ON ITS FORMULATION, PROVISIONS, AND LEGACY vii, vii (Frederick D. Williams ed., 1988) (describing the
Ordinance as "one of the most important laws in the nation's history"); Matthew J. Festa,
PropertyandRepublicanism in the Northwest Ordinance,45 ARIz. ST. L.J. 409,435(2014) ("As

a matter of legal history, [the Northwest Ordinance] also serves as excellent evidence of the
original understandings of the founding generation, especially concerning the original meaning
of the Constitution's property clauses."); James H. Madison, Forward, in THE NORTHWEST

ORDINANCE, 1787: A BICENTENNIAL HANDBOOK vii, vii (Robert M. Taylor, Jr. ed., 1987) ("The
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 is among the most important documents in American history.").
38. BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 8

(1938) ("it appears to be certain that [Northwest Ordinance Article 2's] guarantee of security
to bona fide private contracts was the immediate cause for the proposal of a similar clause in
the Federal [Constitutional] Convention.").
39. JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§

218, at 139 (1840).
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Thus if "just" compensation was originally meant to be merely a
synonym for "full" compensation, there is no obvious reason why the
Takings Clause's drafters would not simply have followed immediately prior practice and said "full" compensation. Their declining to
do so is not, of course, conclusive evidence that "just" compensation
originally meant something different than "full" compensation, but
it is at least suggestive.
An originalist might find this suggestion to be important in itself as
helping to guide a proper interpretation of the Constitution. But even
a non-originalist may find it useful as suggesting that alternative understandings of "just" compensation are possible. As the next section
will discuss, one plausible alternative is "equitable compensation."
III. EQUITABLE COMPENSATION

A. Takings' EquitableAspect
Historically, characterizing just compensation for eminent domain
as equitable was a recurring theme in judicial decisions, although
typically with little attempt to elaborate the implications of that
characterization. For example, Chancellor Kent asserted that "to
render the exercise of the [eminent domain] power valid, a fair compensation must, in all cases, be previously made to the individuals
affected, under some equitable assessment to be provided by law.""
A century later, the U.S. Supreme Court in SeaboardAir Line Railway
Co. v. United States (1923) commented that the MonongahelaNavigation Court's requirement that compensation be "the full and perfect
41
equivalent" of the taken property "rests on equitable principles."
And in United States v. Fuller (1973), the Court acknowledged that
Millerrequires compensation equal to "fair market value" but added
the qualification that "that [fair market value] term is not an absolute
standard nor an exclusive method of valuation."" The Fuller Court
then immediately added, "The constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness as it does from technical concepts of property law.""
40.
41.
42.
43.

Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 166 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (Kent op.).
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923).
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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These allusions to an "equitable" component to takings compensation raise the question of exactly what that means. The term "equity" has multiple meanings, and various taxonomies-often quite
similar-have been offered.44 For our purposes, an elaboration by
John Salmond will be useful. Salmond noted that "the term equity
possesses at least three distinct though related senses.""
In one sense, "which is peculiar to English nomenclature, ...
[e]quity is that body of law which is administered in the Court of
Chancery, as contrasted with the other and rival system administered in the common law courts."" Equity, in this sense, is a particular set of formal rules that now are principally distinguished merely
by having a particular historical origin. Maitland's famous history
of equity focused on this aspect of equity, asserting that "if we were
to inquire what it is that all these rules [of equity] have in common
and what it is that marks them off from all other rules administered
by our courts, we should by way of answer find nothing but this, that
these rules were until lately administered, and administered only,

by our courts of equity."4 7

This formal aspect of equity does sometimes appear in the eminent
domain context. The modern edition of Nichols on Eminent Domain
notes that the judicial process in eminent domain cases involves
aspects traditionally associated with equity, so much so that they
are effectively a hybrid of law and equity.48 And Thomas Merrill's
recent discussion of anticipatory remedies for takings examined
equity in its technical sense. 49
However, this particular understanding of equity is tangential to
the issue under consideration here. This Paper is not suggesting that
takings compensation is (or should be) governed by the developed
44. See, e.g., 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 43-45,
at 46-49 (4th ed. 1918).
45. JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 47 (1902).

46. Id. at 50.
47. F.W. Maitland, The Originof Equity, in EQUITY, AlSO THE FORMS OFACTIONAT COMMON

LAW: Two COURSES OF LECTURES 1 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whitaker eds., 1910) (availableat
ARCHIVE.ORG, https://archive.org/details/equityalsoformso00mait)

48. 6 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 24.01[1] ("It is well settled that condemnation proceedings, although more analogous to a suit in equity than to an action at law (and although
equitable rights are recognized and protected in such proceedings), are brought on the law,
and not the equity, side of the court. Nevertheless, it has been said that a condemnation proceeding is not a common law action.").
49. Thomas W. Merrill, AnticipatoryRemedies for Takings, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1630 (2015).
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body of formal rules and doctrines that are bundled together under
the label "equity." Such a suggestion would be both implausiblesince there is little evidence that prior references to takings compensation as having an "equitable" basis had this technical meaning in
mind-and fruitless-since it is hardly clear how equity's formal
apparatus could offer much help in addressing the specific problem
of binary takings doctrine being compelled to address non-binary
issues. Indeed, Roscoe Pound believed that equity in this first sense
was a late, "decadent" historical development that had strayed from
the original motivations behind equity and that might someday be
replaced by some new set of doctrines that would meet the need for
flexibility no longer addressed by equity in its late, ossified form.50
A second meaning of "equity" in Salmond's taxonomy was the polar
opposite of the first. Rather than identifying a particular set of formal
rules, "it is nothing more than a synonym for natural justice.""
Salmond added, "This is the popular application of the term, and
possesses no special juridical significance."52
This meaning no doubt has played a role in prompting requirements
of compensation when property is taken, and it too is reflected in influential understandings of the Takings Clause. Thus, for example,

Kent asserted that "[a] provision for compensation is a necessary
attendant on the due and constitutional exercise of the power of the
lawgiver to deprive an individual of his property without his consent; and this principle in American constitutional jurisprudence,
is founded in natural equity, and is laid down by jurists as an acknowledged principle of universal law."53 And Story asserted that
the Takings Clause "is founded in natural equity, and is laid down by
jurists as a principle of universal law.""
50. See Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 24 (1905) ("It was
remarked long ago that law and equity are in continual progression, that 'a part of what is
now strict law was formerly considered as equity; and the equitable decisions of this age will
unavoidably be ranked under the strict law of the next.' But in becoming law a principle of
equity loses its quality of elasticity. Hence we may look, not unreasonably, for an action and
reaction from law to equity behind this progression."). Salmond likewise believed that equity
as a particular formal system was a third historical stage in the evolution of the meaning of
"equity." SALMOND, supra note 45, at 50.
51. SALMOND, supra note 45, at 47.

52. Id.
53. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 339 (2d ed. 1832).
54. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNITED STATES § 1790,

at 569-70 (5th ed. 1891) [1833]. In a similar vein, see Youtzy v. Cedar Rapids, 129 N.W. 351,
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However, this very general sense of "equity" is not particularly
useful for addressing the problem at hand. Allowing the government
to pay whatever compensation seems "equitable" in this very vague
sense would naturally raise concerns about indeterminacy and arbitrariness, concerns which historically have accompanied even more
concrete implementations of equity.65 Moreover, its vagueness leaves
this sense of equity unable to point toward any particular solutions
to concrete problems of the sort at issue here.
More useful for present purposes is equity in Salmond's third sense.
In this "legal sense equity means natural justice, not simply, but in
a special aspect, that is to say, as opposed to the rigour of inflexible
rules of law." 6 This sense of equity lies intermediate between the
relative rigidity of equity as a formal system of rules and doctrines,
and the relative vagueness of equity as general "natural justice." It

takes the general moral orientation of the latter sense of equity and
makes it more specific by applying it within the existing context of

the law. In this sense, equity adapts the law to better serve the ends
of justice, stepping in where the law would otherwise be deficient in
certain ways.
Equity's role in meeting the need for flexibility in the legal system
has long been recognized. For example, Pomeroy's equity treatise
praised equity on the grounds that "[n]o doubt (and this is a point of
the highest importance) the system was, and is, much more elastic

and capable of expansion and extension to new cases than the common law."57 Flexibility also played a central role in Roscoe Pound's
summary of the historical development of equity: "Equity, then,
started as a reaction towards justice without law and in its development became a system wherein the element of judicial discretion
was given greater play, and the circumstances of particular cases
were more attended to than the fixety of legal rules would permit.""
352 (Iowa 1911) ("[I]t is to be remembered that in such proceedings the lot owner is not a
willing seller of his property, and he is forced to yield his title and surrender his estate in the
interest of the general public, not infrequently to his great and irreparable inconvenience, if

not actual loss. It is therefore inevitable that juries looking at the apparent natural equities
of the case and deciding between the individual and the public at large are inclined to solve
the doubts if any in favor of the former.").
55. See discussion infra Section III.B.

56. SALMOND, supra note 45, at 47.
57. 1 POMEROY, supra note 44, § 59, at 64.
58. Pound, supra note 50, at 22.
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And Douglas Laycock pithily summarized the "most general distinction between law and equity in the early days": "Law was formal and
rigid; equity was flexible, discretionary-a court of conscience."" Nor
is this understanding of equity's role merely historical. Samuel Bray
has recently argued that one of the two principal functions of the
system of equitable remedies in American law today is to "solve firstorder policy problems: i.e., the circumstances that demand a remedy
compelling action or inaction in flexible and open-ended ways.""
The specific sort of flexibility that theorists saw equity providing
often was considered to be specific to each individual case. For example, E.C. Clark asserted that "'a reasonable view of the circumstances of the case' has been at the bottom of most of the decisions
upon which our rules of English equity were founded: nor do I see how
it can ever cease to be one ground of decision, until every possible
case can be provided for by a previous rule."" Similarly, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Hecht Co. v. Bowles commented, "The essence of
equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity
and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.
2
Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it.""
Although finely grained flexibility of this sort may have a useful
role to play in takings jurisprudence, the flexibility needed to mitigate problems created by the binary nature of takings doctrine could
be more general, offering standardized approaches for different types
of situations. The common thread connecting those approaches would
be that when a specific category of situation does not fit neatly into
existing takings categories, the compensation awarded could deviate
flexibly away from "fair market value" compensation to reflect that
fact. The deviation could be upward or downward-more or less
than market value-depending upon the type of case at hand. Such
an approach would mirror a particular sort of flexibility that Story
59. Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 71 (1992).
See also Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, 135 U. PENN. L. REV. 909,
934 (1987) ("Discretion and flexibility were at the heart of historic equity practice."). Laycock
did express some reservations about the historical accuracy of this traditional understanding:
"I suspect that this historical stereotype is exaggerated, because we also say that the genius
of the common law was in its flexible stability and its capacity for growth within a tradition."
Laycock, supra, at 71.
60. Samuel L. Bray, The System of EquitableRemedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 534 (2016).
61. E.C. CLARK, PRACTICAL JURISPRUDENCE 246 (1883).

62. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
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identified as distinguishing courts of equity from courts of law, the
flexibility to "vary, qualify, restrain, and model the remedy so as to
suit it to mutual and adverse claims, controlling equities, and the

real and substantial rights of all the parties.""
Flexibility in setting the amount of compensation owed would
allow the law to transform binary questions, such as "Was there a
taking?" or "Was the taking for public use?", into graduated questions,
such as "How much of a taking was there?" and "How public was the
use?" As a result, questions that demand "yes" or "no" answers that

in reality are impossible to give would be replaced with questions
that are more tractable.
Part IV, below, will discuss how this sort of flexibility might help
address the difficulties posed by hybrid public-private takings and
regulatory takings. But first it will be useful to address a traditional
concern about equitable approaches to legal problems: the danger of

arbitrariness.
B. Equity and Arbitrariness
Concerns have existed for centuries that equity, because it is
flexible, creates a danger of oppressively unpredictable and unconstrained judgments. In 1689, Selden charged that "[e]quity in Law
is the same that the spirit is in Religion, what ever one pleases to
make it." Selden then drew his famous analogy between measuring
equity according to the idiosyncratic conscience of whoever happens
to be chancellor at the time, and making the linear measure "one

foot" equal to whatever happened to be the length of the current
chancellor's foot. "[W]hat an uncertain measure would this be; One
Chancellor has a long foot another, a short foot a third an indifferent foot; this the same thing in the Chancellors Conscience." 4 A
century and a half later, Story raised similar concerns about equity's potential for arbitrariness:
If, indeed, a Court of Equity in England did possess the unbounded jurisdiction, which has been thus generally ascribed to
it, ... it would be the most gigantic in its sway, and the most
63. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 28, at 22 (2d ed. 1839)
[hereinafter COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE].

64. JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 43 (1689) (Pollock ed. 1927).
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formidable instrument of arbitrary power, that could well be
devised. It would literally place the whole rights and property of
the community under the arbitrary will of the Judge, acting, if you
please, arbitrioboni judicis [with the judgment of a good judge],
and it may be, ex aequo et bono [according to what is equitable
and good], according to his own notions and conscience; but still
65
acting with a despotic and sovereign authority.

Story, however, was quick to add that these concerns were overstated, because equity jurisprudence included significant constraints
that limited its discretion to within certain bounds." Indeed, such
constraints are consistent with equity in general. Pomeroy vigorously defended equity against charges of arbitrariness, asserting
that fidelity to equity's fundamental principles would limit the discretion of judges in equity. 7 Over time, these principles came to be
reflected in a relatively limited set of central maxims. These equitable maxims were (and are) not supposed to determine the outcome
of cases. As we have already seen, avoiding the rigidity of such rules
is one of the very points of equity. Moreover, attempting to determine outcomes simply by applying maxims would often be futile. As
Austin Abbott noted over a century ago,
When the attempt is made, under our system of jurisprudence,
to solve a question by maxims, it usually results in resolving the
question into another double question quite as debatable as the
first, viz.: Which of two maxims is properly applicable? For
instance, "Equality is equity," but on the other hand, "He who is
prior in time is stronger in right," and "The law aids the vigilant,
not the negligent." Upon almost every subject the maxims of
jurisprudence balance themselves against each other in this

way; and the function of justice is to hold the scales so that the
68
preponderating principle shall determine the cause.

65. COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note

63, §

19.

66. Id. ("So far, however, is this from being true, that one of the most common maxims,
upon which a Court of Equity daily acts, is, that Equity follows the law and seeks out and
guides itself by the analogies of the law.").
67. 1 POMEROY, supra note 44, § 59 ("[Equity] has, therefore, as an essential part of its
nature, a capacity of orderly and regular growth, a growth not arbitrary, according to the will
of individual judges, but in the direction of its already settled principles.").
68. Austin Abbott, The Virtue of Maxims, in GEORGE FREDERICKWHARTON,LEGALMAXIMS
5 (1878). Cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) (noting that
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Since Abbott's observation appeared in the foreword to a compendium of legal maxims, it is little surprise that he recognized that
maxims nevertheless do have a useful role to play in legal analysis:
"The best use of maxims under our system is not as authorities, like
a statute or precedent, but as aids to counsel in the investigation of
the controversy, and in determining in preparation for trial what is

the central principle involved, and where the weight of justice lies.""
One might add that maxims in equity have an additional, more

concrete utility. They help direct equity analysis in directions that are
productive of the aims of equity in general, focusing equitable discre-

tion on particular categories of concerns that equity exists to address.
These general observations, however, do not by themselves address
whether understanding "just compensation" to incorporate an aspect
of "equitable compensation" might, in the specific context of eminent
domain, still raise indeterminacy worries. In this context, two different
types of indeterminacy might be of particular concern: indeterminacy
about the amount of compensation that would be awarded when
deviations from the fair-market-value standard occur, and indeterminacy about when those deviations would occur at all.
With respect to how much compensation would be awarded when

the fair-market-value standard is not used-i.e., the concern with how
flexibility in determining compensation would be used-permitting
such flexibility would not necessarily create any more room for arbitrariness than already exists in compensation calculations. "Fair
market value" calculations themselves are not purely mechanical
and can require determinations made under conditions of considerable uncertainty if, for example, the taken property is significantly
dissimilar to property that has recently traded on the market. Even
in the 1930s, Orgel's treatise on the valuation of property in eminent domain ran over eight hundred pages. 70
Moreover, flexible deviations from fair market value need not be
unconstrained. Indeed, such deviations already exist in takings law.
canons of statutory construction often can point in contrary directions). Samuel Bray has de-

scribed equitable maxims as "not rules, in the sense of outcome-determinative legal propositions.
Rather they are concerns, topics of interest, matters on the agenda when judges are deciding
whether to give equitable remedies." Bray, supra note 60, at 582.
69. Abbott, supra note 68, at 5.
70. LEwIs ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1st ed. 1936). The
second edition expanded to two volumes. LEWIS ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT

DOMAIN (2d ed. 1953). The length of Orgel's treatise was not unique; Bonbright's general treatise
on valuation also filled two volumes. JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937).
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In the aftermath of Kelo, several states enacted statutes or constitutional amendments that required paying compensation at specified
fixed percentages above fair market value.71 States also established
distinctions among circumstances which would require additional
compensation. For example, Indiana's statute applied one bonus to
taken agricultural property and a different bonus to taken residential
property.72 Hence, establishing flexibility to deviate from fair market value does not preclude the existence of frameworks governing
how that flexibility is to be exercised, nor of general rules applicable
to every case in specified categories of takings situations.
The possibility of constraints on how deviations from fair market
value would occur does not, however, address the distinct concerns
of arbitrariness in decisions about when such deviations are allowed
in the first place. As Blackstone noted:
[T]he liberty of considering all cases in an equitable light must
not be indulged too far, lest thereby we destroy all law, and leave
the decision of every question entirely in the breast of the judge.
And law, without equity, though hard and disagreeable, is much
more desirable for the public good than equity without law;
which would make every judge a legislator, and introduce most
infinite confusion; as there would then be almost as many different rules of action laid down in our courts, as there are differ73
ences of capacity and sentiment in the human mind.

To allay those concerns, some additional principle is needed that
would help guide those decisions.
To begin, there is good reason to apply the well-established fairmarket-value measure to compensation in core takings cases-e.g.,
when the government straightforwardly confiscates real property for
use by the government. Academics have debated the adequacy of
fair-market-value compensation in ordinary takings cases, but even
if some modification of that standard might be desirable in general,
there are several reasons why that modified standard still provides
71. E.g., Michigan amended its constitution to require payment of at least 125% of fair
market value for taken residential property. MICH. CoNST. art. X,

a similar provision in a statute. Mo. Ann. Stat.
72. Ind. Code Ann. §§ 32-24-4.5-8 (2020).
73. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at 62.

§§

§ 2 (2020).

523.001, 523.039 (2020).

Missouri enacted
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an appropriate default baseline from which flexible deviations would

need to be justified.7 4
First, as noted earlier, the fair-market-value standard has intu-

itive plausibility to those who conceive of eminent domain as a forced
sale, as well as the obvious advantages of familiarity and being the
subject of firmly established expectations.7" However, the standard
also has clear functional advantages. In general, paying compensation equal to the market value of what was lost can often enable the
person who lost the property to purchase a replacement that is at
least roughly equivalent.7 6 Moreover, using a standard market
value-that is outside the control of the parties or the government

reduces the risk of opportunistic "strategic" behavior to manipulate
the amount of compensation paid." And because a property's market
value can be determined, at least in theory, without going to court,
it is relatively easy for private parties and the government to use
when making plans.
Taken together, these familiar facts about market value compensation make it understandable why the fair-market-value standard
is so often used throughout the law, and why it would be desirable
to retain that standard in ordinary takings cases, where the binary
74. For examples of this controversy, see, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain
Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957 (2004); Gideon Kanner, Fairness& Equity or JudicialBaitand-Switch-It's Time to Reform the Law of "Just"Compensation,4 ALBANY Gov. L. REV. 38,
42 (2011); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELLL. REV. 61, 83 (1986).
75. Even someone steeped in equity can recognize the importance of certainty and predictability. Thus Gibson's equity treatise noted,
It is more important to a people to have their laws known and fixed than to have
them precisely just; for our conceptions of justice differ, but what is fixed is
certain, and can be conformed to.. . . It is better that the individual conform to
the law than that the law conform to the individual; and it is better that a
particular case of hardship be unredressed than that the law be violated, when
the violation would occasion much mischief, and especially would unsettle the
foundations of property rights, and disturb the landmarks of the law.
HENRY R. GIBSON, A TREATISE ON SUITS IN CHANCERY § 59, at 49 (2d ed. 1907).
76. In Douglas Laycock's terminology, such compensation, like money damages in general,
is a "substitutionary" remedy. Douglas Laycock, The Deathof the IrreparableInjury Rule, 103
HARV. L. REV. 687, 696 (1990). See also Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 315 (C.C.
Pa. 1795) (noting as an advantage of monetary compensation in takings cases that money "is
a[] universal medium, easily portable, liable to little variation, and readily exchanged for any
kind of property").
77. See Rose, supranote 5, at 591 ("Crystalline rules have a related advantage that has been
much discussed of late: They discourage what is called 'rent-seeking' behavior in decisionmakers, particularly when those decision-makers are legislators.").
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nature of takings doctrine comfortably applies to situations that fall
neatly into one category or another. Even Pomeroy's equity treatise
conceded that
it is also true that from the very necessities of the case there is
another large part of the law which is and must be founded upon
expediency rather than upon morality. The influence of ancient
institutions, the motives of policy, the primary importance of
certainty, the necessity of rules which shall correspond with the
average conduct of men, . .. these and other facts of equal importance must exist in every society ... . This inherent necessity of
a constituent part which is arbitrary and expedient, rather than
just and righteous, is a most important distinction between the
"law" and "equity."7 8

C. When "Full,"When "Equitable"?
Given that fair market value is a useful default baseline for "ordinary" takings cases, two questions now naturally arise: First, how
to know when flexibly deviating from that baseline is appropriate,
and, second, in what direction those deviations should occur. Avoiding
arbitrariness requires having some principle or principles to provide
coherent guidance in answering those questions.
Space does not permit an exhaustive exploration of principles that
might count for or against deviations from the fair-market-value
standard. However, discussing one candidate principle may illuminate how a constrained, principled flexibility could be possible. And
in applying this principle to the specific examples of hybrid publicprivate takings and regulatory takings, the relevance of traditional
aspects of equity will become apparent.
I have argued elsewhere that the government's authority to take
private property rests most plausibly on the existence of reciprocal
79
duties among members of a political community. Property law has
long recognized those duties. Consider, for example, the law of nuisance or of riparian water rights. 80 In the eminent domain context,
78. 1 POMEROY, supra note 44, § 66.
79. See Brian Angelo Lee, UncompensatedTakings: Insurance, Efficiency, and Relational
Justice, 97 TEXAS L. REV. 935 (2019).
80. See, e.g., Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 577 (N.Y. 1876) ("Persons living in organized
communities must suffer some damage, annoyance and inconvenience from each other. For
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these duties explain both why property owners may be required to
relinquish their property to the community when it is needed for
public use, and why the community in turn is obligated to compensate the owner upon whom it has imposed this loss.8 1
Thus, as the relative weights of the parties' duties toward each
other wax or wane, the amount of compensation owed for takings
might grow or diminish correspondingly. At one extreme, the amount
owed might be zero; at the opposite extreme, it might be however
much the property owner cares to demand, no matter how large that
sum might be.
For example, if Jones's activities on Jones's own property violate
duties that Jones has toward his or her neighbors, Jones can be

compelled to cease those activities without receiving any compensation for losses caused by that cessation. Thus Jones is owed zero
compensation for being compelled to remove a structure deemed to
be a public nuisance or that blocks the flow of water in a natural
stream running through multiple properties, including Jones's.82 At
the other extreme, if the government wished to take Jones's property solely to transfer it to some private person, the taking would

not be allowed at all, because (absent some special circumstance)
Jones has no duty to contribute toward that other person's private
projects. 83 As a practical matter, then, that person could acquire
Jones's property only by convincing Jones to sell it, which would
require paying whatever price Jones chose to demand.
Some situations, however, fall somewhere between these two extremes. In such cases, considering the relative weights of the parties'
these they are compensated by all the advantages of civilized society.... But every person is
bound to make a reasonable use of his property so as to occasion no unnecessary damage or

annoyance to his neighbor."); Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 492, 495 (1842) ("Each
riparian proprietor is bound to make such a use of running water, as to do as little injury to
those below him, as is consistent with a valuable benefit to himself.").
81. See Lee, supra note 79, at 967-70.
82. See, e.g., Pucci v. Algiere, 106 R.I. 411, 261 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1970) (affirming a court order
requiring demolition of a building deemed to be a public nuisance); GIBSON, A TREATISE ON
SUITS IN CHANCERY § 50, at 44 (2d ed. 1907) ("A man cannot so divert a stream on his own land
as to turn water injuriously upon a neighbor's land; and he cannot dig so near the land of his
neighbor as to cause the latter's land to cave in, or so near as to endanger his neighbor's wall;
he cannot pollute a stream that flows through his neighbor's land; nor can he so stop, or change,
the current of a stream as to prevent its ordinary flow through the land of another.").
83. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) ("[I]t has long been
accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring
it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.").
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duties toward each other might naturally seem relevant to determining what level of compensation would produce an appropriate resolution. Here the equitable aspect of "just compensation" naturally
comes to the fore, since addressing situations in which competing
legitimate interests require accommodation has long been a fundamental part of equity. As Story's equity treatise noted:
[T]here are many cases in which a simple judgment for either
party, without qualifications or conditions or peculiar arrangements, will not do entire justice ex aequo et bono to either party.
Some modifications of the rights of both parties maybe required;
some restraints on one side, or on the other, or perhaps on both
sides; some adjustments involving reciprocal obligations or duties;
some compensatory or preliminary or concurrent proceedings to
fix, control, or equalize rights; some qualifications or conditions,
present or future, temporary or permanent, to be annexed to the
exercise of rights or the redress of injuries.'

For example, a standard general maxim of equity is "He who seeks
equity must do equity." 5 This maxim, Pomeroy elaborated, "says, in
effect, that the court will give the plaintiff the relief to which he is
entitled, only upon condition that he has given, or consents to give,

the defendant such corresponding rights as he also may be entitled
to in respect of the subject-matter of the suit."86 Pomeroy further
observed that "[t]his principle is not confined to any particular kind
of equitable rights and remedies, but pervades the entire equity
jurisprudence, so far as it is concerned with the administration of
equitable remedies."" In a more specific context, the U.S. Supreme
Court has used a doctrine of "equitable apportionment" to resolve
disputes between states concerning rights to water and other natural resources. 88 And whenever an injunction is sought, courts will
84. COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 63, § 27.
85. See, e.g., JAMES W. EATON & ARCHIBALD H. THROCKMORTON, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 19, at 57 (2d ed. 1923); 1 POMEROY, supra note 44, § 385; COMMENTARIES ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 63, § 59.

86. 1 POMEROY, supra note 44, § 385.
87. Id. § 388.
88. See, e.g., Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025 (1983) ("At the root of the
doctrine is the same principle that animates many of the Court's Commerce Clause cases: a
State may not preserve solely for its own inhabitants natural resources located within its
borders.... Consistent with this principle, States have an affirmative duty under the doctrine
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grant that equitable relief only after "balancing the hardships" that
would result from issuing or denying an injunction. 89
Because of the fundamental role that reciprocal duties play in

justifying eminent domain, it is not surprising that discussions of how
much compensation is appropriate when eminent domain is exercised have echoed this basic equitable approach, albeit without explicitly invoking equity.90 Thus, in Searl v. School District No. 2 in
Lake County, the U.S. Supreme Court commented that
[the right of eminent domain] cannot be exercised except upon
condition that just compensation shall be made to the owner,
and it is the duty of the state, in the conduct of the inquest by
which the compensation is ascertained, to see that it is just not
merely to the individual whose property is taken, but to the
91
public which is to pay for it.

And while Lewis's early twentieth-century eminent domain treatise
observed that "'Just compensation,' ... as used in the constitution,

means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained by the taking
for public use," Lewis immediately added:
It may be more or it may be less than the mere money value of
the property actually taken. The exercise of the power being
necessary for the public good, and all property being held subject
of equitable apportionment to take reasonable steps to conserve and even to augment the

natural resources within their borders for the benefit of other States... . Even though Idaho
has no legal right to the anadromous fish hatched in its waters, it has an equitable right to
a fair distribution of this important resource.").
89. See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) ("A preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. . . . In each case, courts
'must balance the competing claims ofinjury and must consider the effect on each party of the
granting or withholding of the requested relief."') (quoting Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell,
480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987)); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)
("According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction
must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: ... that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a
remedy in equity is warranted .... ").

90. The lack of explicit mention of equity, of course, does not imply that eminent domain
lacks a fundamentally equitable dimension. It may show instead only that such a dimension
has sometimes been overlooked. Cf. 1 POMEROY, supranote 44, § 65 ("[A]t the present day a
large part of the 'law' is motived by considerations of justice, based upon notions of right, and
permeated by equitable principles, as truly and to as great an extent as the complementary
department of the national jurisprudence which is technically called 'equity."').
91. Searl v. School District, 133 U.S. 553, 562 (1890).
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to its exercise when, and as the public good requires it, it would
be unjust to the public that it should be required to pay the owner
more than a fair indemnity for the loss he sustains by the appropriation of his property for the general good. On the other hand,
it would be equally unjust to the owner if he should receive less
than a fair indemnity for such loss. To arrive at this fair indemnity, the interests of the public and of the owner and all the
circumstances of the particular appropriation should be taken
92
into consideration.
IV. APPLICATIONS

These somewhat abstract theoretical considerations have signifi-

cant potential practical benefits. The two challenging categories of
cases noted earlier-hybrid public-private takings and regulatory
takings-provide examples of how attending to the relative weights
of the parties' reciprocal duties, and equitably adjusting compensation in response, can plausibly address difficult cases.

A. Hybrid Public-PrivateTakings
As noted earlier, the doctrinal difficulty with hybrid public-private
takings cases is that they do not seem neatly categorizable as either
"public" uses or "private" uses. Instead, they are a mixture of the two,
with the result that placing them in either category seems to lead to
results that are intuitively unjust. If the use is categorized as "private," the taking becomes impermissible, and the public benefit that
the project would have provided is lost. If the use is categorized as
"public," then the property owners are forced to relinquish their
property-sometimes their homes-for a price lower than the property may have been worth to them, and a private company increases
its profits as a result. Neither result seems quite just, but no other
alternative seems available.
Intuitively, these situations call for an intermediate solution that
recognizes both the extent to which the project in question has public
benefits and the extent to which it merely enhances private profit.
Adjusting the amount of compensation paid for property taken in
such cases is a natural way to effectuate that result. If the taking is
92. 2 JOHN LEwIs, A TREATISE
§ 685, at 1174 (3d ed. 1909).
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permitted, but the compensation required is increased, then the public
gets the benefit of the project's completion, and the extent to which
private profit is increased at the expense of the taken property's

owner diminishes.
This diminution may not only seem more just but also may reduce
incentives for strategic behavior by private entities that might otherwise face greater temptation to try to exploit the state's eminent
domain power for their own private ends. 93 Such a benefit would not
be merely incidental to an equitable measure of compensation. For

example, in Henry Smith's recent account of equity as a second-order
system overseeing law, avoiding opportunistic exploitation of law's
limitations is in fact a central function of equity. 94
The idea of varying compensation for hybrid public-private takings
is not new. During the Supreme Court's oral argument for Kelo, Justice Kennedy asked,
Are there any writings or scholarship that indicates that when you
have property being taken from one private person ultimately to go
to another private person, that what we ought to do is to adjust the
measure of compensation, so that the owner-the condemnee-can
receive some sort of a premium for the development?"

As fate would have it, James Krier and Christopher Serkin had
addressed that very question at approximately the same time,.
93. The existence of strategic behavior can be difficult to prove, but it is sometimes suspected. For example, a newspaper column by Malcolm Gladwell, commenting on a controversial
use of eminent domain to take property in Brooklyn for use by private developers in an urban

development project, reported speculation that the project had included a sports arena (the
present-day Barclays Center) merely to enable the developer to claim that the entire project
was a "public" use and thus to use eminent domain to acquire the needed land. Malcolm
Gladwell, The Nets andNBA Economics, GRANTLAND (Oct. 10, 2011), https://grantland.com/fea
tures/the-nets-nba-economics/. And in a similar case in northern Manhattan, a New York trial

judge suggested that Columbia University had deliberately acquired and then failed to
maintain properties in a specific neighborhood in order to justify a finding that the entire
neighborhood was "blighted," which would enable Columbia to use eminent domain to acquire
the remaining properties for use in Columbia's expansion plans. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban

Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), rev'd 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010). See also
Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1717 (2011) ("it is often less
expensive for [a land] assembler to convince a local government to exercise eminent domain

on its behalf than to purchase the parcels in the real estate market").
94. Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 130 YALE L.J. 1050 (2021).
95. Oral Argument at 21:43, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-108 (question from Kennedy, J.).
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suggesting that "to avoid the clumsy all-or-nothing property rule
approaches to public use .. . together with their high error costs, we
propose a shift to liability rules, with compensation increasing as
skepticism about the public nature and benefits of government action
grows."" (The advocate who answered Justice Kennedy's question
replied prudently but vaguely, "There may be some scholarship

)

about that."97

Recognizing the role of reciprocal duties in justifying eminent domain enables us to see more clearly why it is that increased compensation is appropriate in these sorts of cases: Members of a community,
including owners of property in that community, have obligations to
the community as a whole that they do not have toward private
businesses with which they are not involved. Suzette Kelo had civic
duties toward the city of New London and the state of Connecticut
that she did not have toward shareholders in the Pfizer pharmaceu-

tical company and the Corcoran real estate group. Thus, to the extent
that the project that required taking her property was not fully public,
her duty to relinquish her property was less, and thus the reciprocal
duty to compensate for the loss incurred by the taking was greater. 98
The net result is that compensation in a hybrid taking case should be
higher than the compensation that would have been owed for a purely
public taking, by an amount that reflects the relative amounts of
public benefit and private profit expected from the project.
These considerations echo equity's concern, noted above, for attaining outcomes that reflect the extent of both parties' duties toward
each other. It also reflects the equitable principle that unjust enrichment is to be avoided, a principle sometimes stated as a maxim that
one shall not profit from imposing a loss on another. 99 In the context
96. Krier & Serkin, supra note 14, at 874.
97. Oral Argument at 22:05, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-108 (answer by Bullock).
98. Whether this analysis further implies that takings for use by public utilities or common carriers, such as railroads, should also require paying compensation greater than the
taken property's market value is a question that space does not permit considering here.
Historically, such takings have been a significant fraction of exercises of eminent domain. See,
e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 77 (3d ed. 2008).

99. The maxim is derived from Roman law and in the past was invoked in Latin phrasing
such as nemo debet locupletarialienajactura [no one should be enriched by another's loss].
See, e.g., KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 91-92 (1825). In the context of property law, cases invoking this maxim commonly involve potential unjust enrichment from mistaken improvements.
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of hybrid public-private takings, this equitable principle would prohibit the private beneficiary from profiting from a wrongful taking.
Ordinarily, the state commits no wrong in merely exercising its power
of eminent domain, because that power is well-established as legitimate, provided that the state pays just compensation for what it takes.
Thus, payment of an appropriate amount of compensation is not compensation for a wrong but rather is a necessary element in preventing a wrong from occurring in the first place.100 But to the extent
that a special private benefit results from a hybrid public-private
taking-for example, the benefit enjoyed by a private land developer
as a result of takings used in an economic development projectpaying an amount of compensation that is less than the owner would
have demanded in a voluntary private exchange seems insufficient
to avoid wrongdoing. Hence, to prevent the "private" part of the hybrid
public-private taking from becoming wrongful-and thus to prevent
the private beneficiary from unjustly enriching itself-an equitable
approach to compensation would require that the private beneficiary
pay more than fair market value compensation, to the extent that the
benefit from the taking is private rather than public." 1
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Barnum, 31 Md. 425, 453 (1869) ("In such cases a Court of Equity
practically enforces the rule of the civil law, founded in natural justice, 'nemo debet locupletari

alienajactura,' as well

as the cherished maxim of equity jurisprudence itself, that 'he who
seeks equity must do equity."'); Mickles v. Dillaye, 17 N.Y. 80, 92 (1858) ("Under such circumstances, he should not be allowed, in a court of equity, to enrich himself at the expense of one

who has acted innocently."); Bright v. Boyd, 4 F. Cas. 127, 132-33 (C.C.D. Me. 1841) (Story, J.)
("Upon the general principles of courts of equity, acting ex aequo et bono [according to what
is equitable and good], ... compensation, under such circumstances, ought to be allowed to the
full amount of the enhanced value, upon the maxim of the common law, 'nemo debet locupletari

ex alterius incommodo' [no one should be enriched by the inconvenience of another]....").
100. I have elaborated on this point elsewhere. See Brian Angelo Lee, Emergency Takings,
114 MICH. L. REV. 391, 403-04 (2015).
101. Exactly how to calculate the proper amount of extra compensation is a significant
question, challenging in ways that valuation questions in the law are commonly challenging.
Space does not permit thorough consideration of this question, but one natural possibility
would be to determine or stipulate what percentage above fair market value would have been
demanded by an owner in order to agree to relinquish the property voluntarily-absent

holding out strategically-and then to reduce that percentage by the extent to which the
project was public rather than private. For example, if a payment of 50% above fair market

value is what would have induced a voluntary transfer, and the project is determined to be
60% public and 40% private, then the awarded compensation would be 100% of fair market

value plus (40%)*(50%), for a total of 120% of fair market value. If the project was purely
public, then compensation would then simply be 100% of fair market value, since (0%)*(50%)
equals 0%, and thus zero bonus would be added to the property's fair market value. In the
aftermath of Kelo, Connecticut enacted a less nuanced but easily administrable version ofthis

approach, requiring that all property taken by redevelopment agencies receive compensation

PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL

346

[Vol. 10:315

B. Regulatory Takings
Considering the equitable dimension of takings compensation may
also help trim the thickets of regulatory takings doctrine. The jurisprudence and scholarship on regulatory takings are now vast, but
for purposes of illustrating the potential usefulness of an equitable
approach to just compensation, discussion of one landmark case will
be sufficient-Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City.
At issue in Penn Centralwas a challenge to New York's landmarks
preservation law, which prevented the Penn Central railroad company
from constructing a tall office tower above Grand Central Terminal
but granted Penn Central transferable development rights to miti10 2
gate the burden of not being able to build the desired addition. In
addressing this challenge, the Court explicitly declined to answer
whether the transferable development rights constituted "just compensation.""' Instead, the Court concluded that the regulation was
not a taking, and thus there was no need for compensation at all.
However, the compensation issue did not disappear. It was merely
pushed into the shadows, and it implicitly became a basis for the

Court's decision:
Stated baldly, appellants' position appears to be that the only
means of ensuring that selected owners are not singled out to
endure financial hardship for no reason is to hold that any
restriction imposed on individual landmarks pursuant to the
New York City scheme is a "taking" requiring the payment of
"just compensation." Agreement with this argument would, of
course, invalidate not just New York City's law, but all compara0 4
ble landmark legislation in the Nation. We find no merit in it."

The Court's assertion that deeming the law to be a taking requiring
payment of "just compensation" would "invalidate" landmark-preservation statutes implied that concerns about compensation were
equal to 125% of the taken property's fair market value. Act of June 25, 2007, Pub. Act No. 07141, § 8, 2007 Conn. Acts 407, 421 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-129(a)(2)).
Rhode Island required compensation of at least 150% of fair market value for "property taken
for economic development purposes." Rhode Island Home and Business Protection Act of 2008,
ch. 64.12, sec. 1, § 42-64.12-8, 2008 R.I. Pub. Laws 1080, 1082 (codified at R.I. Gen. Laws § 4264.12-8(a)).
102. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
103. Id. at 122-23.
104. Id. at 131.
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central to the Court's decision, since merely finding that a regulation
had effected a taking would not by itself invalidate the regulation.
Takings become impermissible only if they are not for public use or
if just compensation is not paid, and there was no suggestion that
landmarks preservation laws were not for public use. 10 5 The Court's
reasoning seems ultimately to rest upon two tacit assumptions: first,
that "just compensation" meant "full" compensation; and, second,
that governments could not afford to pay full compensation for the
burdens imposed by landmark-preservation legislation.
These assumptions were plausible in light of both existing takings
doctrine, which requires full compensation for all takings, and the
limited budgets of state and local governments. New York City, in
particular, at this time was in especially dire fiscal straits.1 0 6
However, as a matter of logic, these assumptions are peculiar considerations for determining whether a taking has occurred. While
the government's ability to pay compensation might seem relevant
to determining how much compensation to require, it is not obviously relevant to determining the nature of the loss that the government has imposed. How much money a city is capable of paying for
"taken" property seems irrelevant to determining whether the city
has in fact taken property, just as whether a trespass or theft has
occurred is independent of whether the alleged trespasser or thief
is wealthy enough to pay compensation for those acts.
Moreover, it is analytically incomplete to move, as the court's discussion tacitly did, from the assumption that governments could not
afford to pay full compensation for the costs imposed by landmarkspreservation legislation to the conclusion that therefore they must not
be obligated to pay any compensation. An alternative, more natural
conclusion would have been that the inability to pay full compensation
105. The validity of the landmarks preservation law was uncontested. Id. at 129 ("[A]ppellants do not contest that New York City's objective of preserving structures and areas with
special historic, architectural, or cultural significance is an entirely permissible governmental

goal. They also do not dispute that the restrictions imposed on its parcel are appropriate
means of securing the purposes of the New York City law.").
106. The dissent in Penn Centralacknowledged this fact explicitly. Id. at 152 ("The city of
New York is in a precarious financial state .... ") (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). Just three years be-

fore this case was decided, New York City had sought a federal bailout. President Gerald Ford's
refusal to grant a bailout prompted a classic New York tabloid headline: "Ford To City: Drop
Dead." Ford to City: Drop Dead in 1975, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.nydaily
(originews.com/new-york/president-ford-announces-won-bailout-nye-1975-article-1.2405985
nally published by Frank Van Riper, Ford to City: Drop Dead, DAILY NEWS, Oct. 30, 1975).
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might have justified an obligation to pay only partial compensation.
While the established doctrinal assumption that "just compensation"
necessarily means "full compensation" obscured that possibility, recognizing the equitable dimension of takings compensation could have
brought it to light.
Compensation considerations played an additional peculiar role
in the Court's reasoning. Following the lead of PennsylvaniaCoal v.
Mahon, where a regulation's producing (or not producing) an "average reciprocity of advantage" was a factor in determining whether
the regulation had created a taking, the Penn Central Court argued
that Grand Central Terminal's owners' having enjoyed benefits from
the regulation argued against the landmark law's having effectuated a taking.10 7 Whether a regulation has provided benefits as well
as burdens, with the result that the regulation's net burden is less
than it might otherwise have been, is obviously relevant for determining the amount of compensation that would be necessary to
make whole the loss created by that regulation. Less obvious, however,
is its relevance to determining whether any compensation is owed at
all. The assumption, in both Mahon and Penn Central, that whether
an owner has received some compensation illuminates whether the

government owes any compensation again involves an unmotivated
logical leap.
A more natural and plausible way to address the Court's concerns
about non-monetary compensation received by the burdened owner,
and about the government's ability to pay monetary compensation,
would have been to treat those concerns as questions about the
amount of compensation owed, rather than as questions about
whether compensation was owed at all. Such quantity questions, in
turn, would naturally have lent themselves to resolution by "balancing the equities" of the situation. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted
in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, "The qualities of mercy and practicality have
made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation
between the public interest and private needs as well as between
competing private claims."' 08
107. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134-35
("we cannot conclude that the owners of the Terminal have in no sense been benefited by the
Landmarks Law").
108. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944). See also Case Note, Injunction.
Trespass to Land. Balance of Convenience, 33 YALE L.J. 205, 206 (1923) ("It is not always
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Thus freed to consider what amount of compensation would be

equitable, given the circumstances of the case, the Court could more
naturally have considered the dispute's intuitively salient features:

the hardship to the public if the government had to pay a practically
infeasible amount of compensation, with the result that a unique
public landmark would be irretrievably lost at a time when trends
in architecture ensured that nothing similar would arise to replace
it; the hardship to the railroad if it was limited in its ability to seek
sources of revenue ancillary to its struggling railroad business; and
the fact that the landmark-preservation law required Penn Central
to continue to provide a benefit to others-in the form of maintaining Grand Central Terminal in its original Beaux Arts glory-rather
than discontinue inflicting a harm, contrary to American law's typical
tendency to impose negative duties rather than positive duties.109
And the Court could then have compared the required amount of
compensation to the amount of compensation already received in the
form of transferable development rights.
Ultimately, with multiple demands on public coffers, and not
enough money to go around, a balancing of the equities between the
railroad and the city might have produced the same outcome as
actually occurred: the restriction was permitted and the railroad

received partial, non-monetary compensation in the form of transferable development rights. However, the reasoning that led to that
result might have been more straightforward and predictable, allowing the Court to use traditional equitable considerations to determine
how much compensation was owned, rather than offering a potentially
realized that in applying the doctrine of the 'balance of convenience' courts not only compare
the relative loss and gain to the parties in this litigation, but consider also the effect upon the
community at large.").

109. In law-and-economics terminology, the landmark-preservation regulation required
continuing to provide a positive externality rather than requiring cessation of a negative
externality. Observations about the law's imposing negative duties more often than positive

duties are well-established in the torts context. See, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty
to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 219 (1908) ("There is no
distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more fundamental than that between

misfeasance and non-feasance, between active misconduct working positive injury to others
and passive [inaction], a failure to take positive steps to benefit others, or to protect them from
harm not created by any wrongful act of the defendant.") Cf. KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY
88 (1825) ("equity never obliges any man, whether by acting or suffering, to increase the estate

of another."). But see Kenneth S. Abraham & Leslie Kendrick, There's No Such Thing asAffirmative Duty, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1649 (2019) (challenging the viability in tort law of the distinction
between misfeasance and non-feasance).
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arbitrary miscellany of considerations that somehow together pointed
toward a conclusion that no taking had occurred, and therefore that
zero compensation was required."1 0 An equitable approach might have
laid a more coherent and solid foundation for future development of
regulatory takings jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
If the foregoing discussion has been convincing, then eminent
domain doctrine can benefit from greater attention to the equitable
aspect of takings compensation for types of cases that do not fall
neatly within established takings doctrines' binary categories. Compensation's natural amenability to gradation can mitigate the all-ornothing nature of the other elements that determine whether an
exercise of government power qualifies as a valid taking. And equity
can provide established, principled guides in flexibly adjusting that
compensation to address novel or atypical categories of cases-

principles that can both reduce arbitrariness and direct the exercise
of this flexibility in directions productive of takings compensation's
underlying purposes.

110. Henry Smith has argued that the proliferation of unhelpful multifactor balancing tests
in the law in general is, at least in part, a consequence of equity's eclipse following the fusion
of law and equity. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 94, at 1137. Smith's argument might recommend
a more equity-based approach to regulatory takings jurisprudence in general. This Paper's
suggestion is narrower, suggesting only that the compensation aspect of regulatory takings
might benefit from an equitable approach. Whether equity might have potential benefits for
other aspects of regulatory takings law is a question that lies beyond the scope of this Paper.

